

Firewall Evolution - Deep Packet Inspection

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Firewalls provide a variety of services to networks in terms of security. They provide for network address translation (NAT), virtual private networks (VPN), and filtering of traffic that does not conform to the network's stated security policy. They range from simple packet filters to circuit-level gateways to proxy firewalls. Firewalls are being asked to fill a larger and larger role in network security these days than several years ago. One of the more recent innovations in firewall technology is the integration of Intrusion Detection (IDS) and Deep Packet Inspection (DPI) capabilities with traditional stateful firewall technology. Traditional networks have a defined boundary between the internal network and the external network, with a sensor sitting behind it.

One of the primary benefits of the traditional firewall/IDS deployment is that the failure of one component does not leave the network completely unprotected. Also, IDS appliances can be deployed throughout the LAN and monitor traffic *inside* the defined boundary areas between networks. This design is illustrated in Figure 1 below. The IDS monitors traffic that is allowed through the firewall (as defined in the firewall policy) and inspects packets for malicious activity.




Figure 1 - Traditional Firewall Deployment Design

With Deep Packet Inspection firewalls the IDS collapses into the firewall such that the firewall provides for intrusion detection and eliminates an additional piece of network equipment which can fail while increasing the capabilities inherent in a firewall. This design covers one particular form (and function) of firewalls -- stateful firewalls and how deep packet inspection provides for more capabilities than these firewalls than ever before.

Stateful Firewalls -- An Overview

In the early stages of firewalls all traffic had to be explicitly specified whether it was permitted. A good example of this was the original Linux firewall. This firewall (whether manipulated with *ipfwadm* or *ipchains* require each rule to specify the firewall (regardless of direction) be specified. The firewall did not keep track of the various sessions that may be active through the firewall.

Stateful inspection changed all that. Invented by Check Point Software Technologies in the mid-to-late 1990s, stateful inspection became an industry standard. Stateful inspection provides for the analysis of packets at the network layer (and transport layer in the OSI model but the firewall may look at layers above that as well) in order to assess the validity of the information from various layers (transport, session, and network) the firewall is better able to understand the context of the traffic. It also provides for the ability to create virtual sessions in order to track connectionless protocols such as UDP and RPC-based applications.

Application proxy firewalls have been around for a long time but have failed to control the emerging threat of application-specific attacks. Additionally, the multitude of applications requiring support as well as the additional latency have dampened their effectiveness.

firewalls.

The reality of modern application demands and capabilities require that firewalls with a much more intimate application payload. Emerging applications utilizing XML and Simple Object Access Protocol (SOAP) require content within the packets at wire-speed. Additionally, applications which can change their communication outbound filtering or those which tunnel within commonly allowed ports (such as 80/TCP) must be monitored to the maximum amount of security within the network. In order to meet these new demands stateful firewall

Deep Packet Inspection

Deep Packet Inspection is a term used to describe the capabilities of a firewall or an Intrusion Detection System to inspect the application payload of a packet or traffic stream and make decisions on the significance of that data based on a signature-based engine that drives deep packet inspection typically includes a combination of signature-matching technology and statistical analysis of the data in order to determine the impact of that communication stream. While the concept of deep packet inspection is not so simple to achieve in practice. The inspection engine must use a combination of signature-based analysis, statistical, or anomaly analysis, techniques. Both of these are borrowed directly from intrusion detection technology. To handle traffic at the speeds necessary to provide sufficient performance newer ASICs will have to be incorporated. These ASICs, or Network Processors Units (NPUs), provide for fast discrimination of content within packets for application classification. Deep Packet Inspection capable firewalls must not only maintain the state of the underlying communication channel, but also the state of the application utilizing that communication channel.

For example, consider an SMTP connection between a mail client and a server shown in Figure 1(a) below. The connection is established with the typical TCP three-way handshake. The firewall allows the connection because it has the ruleset state that traffic to the mail server host is permitted. In Figure 1(b) the connection has been entered into the state table




Figure 2 - Stateful Firewall Connection

For most stateful firewalls the establishment of the connection and the monitoring of it for when connector. However, such firewalls do not look further up the protocol stack for events that may be considered "out-of-a firewall that is capable of Deep Packet Inspection the firewall can look at the SMTP protocol and monitor it. In Figure 2 below. In Figure 2(a) the client establishes the SMTP connection by following the RFC defined procedure, waiting for the response by the mail server. The client may then issue a variety of commands including sending an SMTP command **MAIL FROM:** . In Figure 2(b) the client tries to issue a **VRFY** command. The firewall monitoring the connection between the client and the mail server may raise an alarm or respond to the **VRFY** command by disallowing the connection. This exploit, the sendmail address token overflow (discussed in the CERT bulletin CA-2003-12) in order to gain access to the mail server. A stateful firewall, because it is capable of Deep Packet Inspection, is able to identify the exploit attempt and deny the connection from the client altogether.




Figure 3 - Deep Packet Inspection Firewall

In order to be successful with Deep Packet Inspection the firewall must provide significant intrusion detection capabilities. These capabilities include performing anti-virus screening in-line and at wire-speeds. Additionally the firewall must analyze, and, if necessary, filter Extensible Markup Language (XML) traffic, dynamically proxy instant messengers like Yahoo IM, and MSN IM. Additionally the firewall will have to provide for wire-speed Secure Socket Layer (SSL) filtering. This will obviously require the capability to decrypt an SSL session and then re-establish it once the

The need for this technology and this capability in firewalls stems from such data-driven attacks as *Code Red* and *SQL Slammer* worm. Current IDS technology, while able to detect these attacks, provided very little prevention. Each of these worms infected a significant number of systems within a relatively short period of time. The infection routes posed serious difficulties for IDS in particular. While IDS provided some relief from each of these attacks, detection and response directly to the firewall through Deep Packet Inspection provides for immediate termination of the line of communication at a network demarcation point.

Next Generation Firewalls

While current stateful firewall technology provides for tracking the state of a connection, most current firewalls do not perform analysis of the application data. Several firewall vendors, including Check Point, Cisco, Netscreen, Network Intrusion Detection (acquired Intruvert), and TippingPoint, are moving in the direction of integrating this analysis into the firewall. Some vendors provide for some Deep Packet Inspection capabilities in the PIX firewall. For example, the command: **fixup** provides for some Deep Packet Inspection capabilities in the PIX firewall. For example, the command: **fixup** to perform several functions including:

- URL logging of GET messages
- URL screening through N2H2 or Websense
- Java and ActiveX filtering

For the last two functions above the firewall must also be configured with the **filter** command. These functions are new capabilities which must be included in firewalls in order to provide a greater degree of protection to networks. These new capabilities rely on pattern-matching techniques to identify attacks and, also as with traditional IDSs, rely on pattern-matching in the detection methods to avoid raising alarms.

As Deep Packet Inspection technology continues to improve the capability to provide more robust and dynamic protection, the use of firewalls will only continue to increase. Moving the inspection of the data in packets to the network firewall provides flexibility in defending their systems from malicious traffic and attacks. Such firewalls do not eliminate the need for IDSs, they merely collapse the IDS that should sit directly behind the firewall into the firewall itself. However, the use of firewalls as part of an overall defense-in-depth approach remains unchanged.

Author Credit

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