



The Year In Flash


The year in Flash bugs, exploits and mitigations

Natalie Silvanovich

@natashenka

About me

- Natalie Silvanovich
AKA natashenka AKA Flashtasha
- Project Zero member
- Previously did mobile security on
Android and BlackBerry
- Flash enthusiast
- Reporter of $\frac{1}{3}$ of Flash
vulnerabilities



My goal



My goal

- Bug finding is my top priority
 - Mostly code review
 - Some fuzzing (with Mateusz Jurczyk AKA j00ru)
 - 1 bug per day -> 1 bug per week
 - Flash bugs stay gone
- Analyze external bugs and exploits

My goal

- Occasionally exploit bugs to answer questions
 - Is exploitation possible?
 - Is exploitation reliable?
 - How does X impact exploitability
- Work on mitigations (with James Forshaw and Mark Brand)

This talk

- Attack surface
- The year in Flash
 - New bugs and bug classes
 - 0-days, 1-days and other exploits
 - Mitigations
- The future?

Flash is ...

- AS2 -- ActionScript 2
 - Interpreted legacy Flash Scripts with own VM
 - Reduced API set
 - Generally more bugs with lower exploitability
 - Blurry boundaries between VM and APIs

Flash is ...

- AS3 -- ActionScript 3
 - Modern VM with JIT and interpreter
 - Extendible
 - GC Heap / Fixed Heap
 - Optimized for Flash
 - Open source VM
 - Open and closed source APIs
 - Bugs are less dense but more exploitable

Flash is ...


- Anticorpus

- Functionality outside of script
- MP4 parser, zlib, regex, image decoders, etc

Warning



Timeline



Hacking Team

Google

July 2015

- Large update (36 bugs)
- Hacking Team dump
- Mitigations

July 2015

- Hacking Team dump contained two 0-days and two fixed bugs
 - ByteArray/OpaqueBackground -- 0-day UaFs due to valueOf redefinition (CVE-2015-0349 and CVE-2015-05122)
 - ConvolutionFilter issue shown earlier (CVE-2015-3039/CVE-2015-0349)
 - Integer overflow in Function.apply -- reported via Chromium VRP before use (CVE-2015-0387)
 - NULL pointer in BitmapData, not exploitable (CVE-2015-05123)


CVE-2015-3039

- Redefinition issue in ConvolutionFilter (also reported by bilou)
- AS2 allows any method to be redefined in script (monkey-patching)
- Generally native methods accept any type and convert objects with `valueOf`, `toString`, `object constructor`, etc.

CVE-2015-3039

```
var filter = new ConvolutionFilter(...);  
var n = { valueOf : ts };  
var a = [];  
a[0] = n;  
filter.matrix = a;  
function ts() {  
    filter.matrix = [1];  
}
```

[{ valueOf : ts }]



July 2015

- `valueOf/toString` bugs receive increased attention
 - Many similar bugs reported in next few months
 - Adobe starts efforts to pre-emptively fix similar bugs
- 33 bugs in regular update
- Vector mitigations implemented

Vector Mitigation

"I don't afraid Adobe analysts at all" -- Vitaly Toropov

- Adds checksums to Vectors that are checked before doing sensitive functions
- Some Vectors are also on their own heap page
- Reduced the reusability of exploit code
- Generally increases the quality of bug needed for an exploit
- Substitution of ByteArray or BitmapData is possible, but not as good

CVE-2015-3130

- Redefinition issue involving valueOf

CVE-2015-3130

```
var s = 1;
var rec_array:Array = new Array();
rec_array.push({name: "john", city: "omaha"});
rec_array.push({name: "bob", city: "omaha"});
rec_array.length = {valueOf : gl};

rec_array.sortOn(["name", "city"]);
```

```
function gl(){
    if(s< 3){
        s++;
        return 100000;
    }else{
        return 2;
    }
}
```


```
[{name: "john", city: "omaha"},
{name: "bob", city: "omaha"},
{valueOf : gl}]
```

```
if (array->getLength() == 0){ return; }

int length = array->getLength();

char** s = new char*[array->getLength()]
memcpy(s, array->items, length);
```

Timeline



Vector Mitigation

Hacking Team

Google

August 2016

- Many more bugs similar to HT bugs
- MC UaFs pour in

CVE-2015-5550 (MovieClip UaFs)

- Very common AS2 bug, 100+ reported this year
 - Small variety of freed object
- Also works with TextFields
- Root cause is that display fields are freed outside of garbage collection
 - Always, for real, even if there are references (in AS2)


CVE-2015-5550 (MovieClip UaFs)

- Happens when function parameters are converted after local variables are initialized, but before they are used
- Fixed by enforcing convert -> initialize -> use order


CVE-2015-5550 (MovieClip UaFs)

```
var clip1 = this.createEmptyMovieClip  
("clip1", 1);  
var clip2 = this.createEmptyMovieClip  
("clip2", 2);  
var n = {toString: func};  
clip1.swapDepths(n);  
  
function func(){  
    clip1.removeMovieClip();  
    return "clip2";  
}
```

```
SO *s = GetObject()  
MC *m = native_data[10];
```



Timeline



September/October 2015

- 23 bugs in September updates and 20 in October
 - Mostly UaFs and other redefinition bugs
- 0-day immediately after October update (reported by TrendMicro, NATO targets)

CVE-2015-7645

- Reported two weeks before it was found in the wild
- Type confusion in serializations, due to weird AVM behaviour
- Two other variants also reported and fixed in emergency patch
- None of these bugs compile

CVE-2015-7645

From the AVM:

```
// In theory we should reject duplicate slots here;  
// in practice we don't, as it causes problems with some existing content  
//if (basetb->findBinding(name, ns) != BIND_NONE)  
//  toplevel->throwVerifyError(kIllegalOverrideError, toplevel->core()-  
>toErrorString(qn), toplevel->core()->toErrorString(this));
```

tl;dr a method can be overridden by a var

Most natives don't make assumptions, but some do. Especially interfaces.

CVE-2015-7645

```
class superclass{
    ...
    public function writeExternal(){
        return 1;
    }
}

class subclass extends superclass{
    public var writeExternal:uint = 7;
    ...
}
```

CVE-2015-7645

From the AVM:

```
Multiname mn(core->getPublicNamespace(t->pool),  
             core->internConstantStringLatin1(kWriteExternal));  
m_functionBinding = toplevel->getBinding(t, &mn);
```


and later:

```
MethodEnv* method =  
    obj->vtable->methods[AvmCore::bindingToMethodId(info->get_functionBinding())];  
method->coerceEnter(argc, argv);
```

How was this bug exploited?

- Traits property array is variable-sized
- Corrupted ByteArray to get R/W access to entire memory space

Timeline



November and December 2015

- Huge Dec update, 79 bugs, mostly MC UaF
 - Structural changes to AS2 to make broad fixes
- New mitigations
 - Checksumming on ByteArray
 - Isolated Heap
 - NOP slide mitigations
- Exploit kit 1-day and 0-day

CVE-2015-8446

- 1-day in Angler
- Similar to CVE-2015-5560
- Integer overflow in ID3 allocation
 - Controllable size
 - Controllable overwrite
- Exploited using BitmapData


CVE-2015-8651

- Integer overflow leading to heap overflow in JIT (reported by Huawei)

CVE-2015-8651

- SWF contained two exploits
 - Typical vector exploit
 - Post Isolated Heap exploit including such elements as
 - Long if statements nested almost 100 times
 - Using both a media file and an image to fill heap slots at different points in the exploit
 - Triggering the bug ~600 times
 - Final results was memory space access via ByteArray

Timeline




February 2016

- 22 bugs fixed
 - UaF stragglers
 - Fuzz bugs, mostly media
 - Exception-related bugs

CVE-2016-0985

- Unusual type confusion in AS3
- Occurs due to catching an exception
 - Should have been fatal error



CVE-2016-0985

```
try{  
    var t = new TextField();  
} catch(e:Error) {  
    var t2 = new TextField();  
}
```


MovieObject
text* textAsset
...

Assets
0001 : myFont (type font)
0002 : myVideo (type video)
FFF7 : myFont1 (type <i>text</i>)
...
FFF7 : emptyTxt (type text)

CVE-2016-0984


- Read-only UaF in Sound class
- Exception-related

CVE-2016-0984



```
var s = new Sound();  
var b = new ByteArray(); // 1000 bytes  
s.loadPCMFromArray(b, 100, "float", false, 2.0);  
var c = new ByteArray(); // size 2  
try{  
    s.loadPCMFromArray(c, 1, "float", false, 2.0);  
}catch (e:Error) {}  
s.extract(b, 1, 0);
```

Timeline



March 2016

- 22 bugs fixed
 - More fuzz bugs
 - Exploited one
 - UaFs
- pwn2own
 - 4 MC UaFs, one parsing bug in JPG
- 0-day
 - Overflow in Bitmap in platform-specific code

CVE-2016-0998


- Exploitable fuzz bug
- Caused by UaF check
- Required ASLR bypass
- Got around IsoHeap with JIT pages

CVE-2016-0998

```
var o = {};  
o.unwatch();
```

```
void* args = alloca(numArgs);  
...  
convertToString(args[0])
```

Timeline



Hacking Team

April 2016

- 24 bugs fixed
 - Fuzzed images
 - The UaFs continue
- 0-day
 - Reported by TrendMicro in Magnitude EK
 - Type confusion in FileReference
 - Did not work on current mitigation set (0 on free)




CVE-2016-1019

- 0-day vulnerability
- Reported some variants
- Type confusion in AS2


CVE-2016-1019

```
var o = { toString : f };  
var t = new TextField(o);
```

```
function f(){  
    var fr = FileReference  
    fr.call(this);  
}
```




Timeline



Hacking Team

Timeline



June 2016

- 36 bugs fixed
 - MC UaFs (echo from pwn2own)
- 0-day
 - Reported by Kaspersky
 - OOB memory access in open source parser

CVE-2016-4171

```
void AbcParser::parseExecPolicyAttributes(const uint8_t*
metadata, MethodInfo* m)
{
...
    for (int q = 0; q < values_count; ++q)
    {
        Stringp key = pool->getString(readU30(p));
        Stringp val = pool->getString(readU30(p));
    }
}
```

CVE-2016-4171

```
Stringp PoolObject::getString(int32_t index) const
{
    ConstantStringData* dataP = _abcStrings->data + index;
    if (dataP->abcPtr >= _abcStringStart && dataP->abcPtr <
        _abcStringEnd)
    {
        uint32_t len = AvmCore::readU32(dataP->abcPtr);
        Stringp s = core->internStringUTF8((const char*) dataP-
>abcPtr, len, true, false);
        s->Stick();
        dataP->abcPtr = NULL
        WBRC(core->gc, _abcStrings, &dataP->str, s);
    }
    return dataP->str;
}
```

Conclusions

- Finding bugs in Flash is generally getting harder
 - 1 bug per day versus 1 per week
- Certain bug classes are drying up, but others are taking their places
- Flash mitigations are making it more difficult to exploit bugs, especially with low-quality bugs

The Future (What's left?)

- MC UaFs (and AS2) probably still exist, but getting hard to exploit
 - Eventually similar bugs will have marginal utility
 - Display UaFs in AS3?
- Redefinition bugs are no longer 'deep'
- More AS3 bugs?

The Future (What's left?)

- More anticorpus bugs / use of anti-corpus?
 - Media (MP4, FLV)
- Open source AVM?
- Platform-specific code
- Flash deprecation
 - Browsers?

Thank You

- Adobe

Questions?



<http://googleprojectzero.blogspot.com/>

@natashenka

natalie@natashenka.ca