

# MIME SNIFFING ISSUES

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# Using Tracker for issues

- Open issues:
  - <http://trac.tools.ietf.org/wg/websec/trac/query?status=new&status=assigned&status=reopened&component=mime-sniff>
- This talk a brief review of some of issues
- Please use tracker for new issues and to summarize results of discussions

# #15: Scope of document

- Introductory rationale lists:
  - *Web sites where HTTP content-type label doesn't seem to match author's intent*
- Document covers many other use cases:
  - *Content delivered by other means than HTTP (ftp:, file: URIs)*
  - *No HTTP content-type is supplied at all*
- In practice, sniffing is used also for other situations
  - *email clients*
  - *W3C Web Application packaging*

*Algorithm inadequate for all use cases?*

- *ftp uses file extension*
- *Sniffing of content-type for new MIME types*

# #17 Use magic numbers in MIME registry

- Scope covers “no content-type supplied” cases
  - Need to be able to sniff new types
- Use “magic numbers” in IANA MIME registry?
  - Current registry content is haphazard
  - Would need to update registry or create a new one

# #18 using file extensions

- File extensions are not used for HTTP
- BUT scope covers ftp, file:, zip packaging
  - Those use cases \*do\* use file extensions
- File extensions are also part of IANA MIME registry
  - Again, MIME registry content is haphazard

# #19: Do not sniff PDF

- Adobe Acrobat, Reader are popular interpreters for ISO 32000 format (aka application/pdf)
- Some browsers (Google Chrome, Apple Safari) have independent implementations
- Adobe developers request that no mislabeled content be sent to their software
  - Even if there are some sites with mislabeled content
  - Do Chrome and Safari development groups prefer sniffing?
  - Is sniffing “maximum allowed”?
  - Does content receiving software get to “opt out”?

## #20 Opt-in on case-by-case basis

- *If goal is to reduce amount of sniffing over time*
- As written, two conforming kinds of receivers:
  - NO sniffing at all
  - EXACTLY follow algorithm as specified
  - (except 'algorithm' has options for waiting or not waiting)
- Consider user with two browsers
  - One sniffs, others doesn't
  - Based on return value, chooses one or the other to display
  - SHOULD be conforming, but isn't
- Expressing this is hard

## #21 “Polyglot” use cases

- Content which is legitimately interpretable as more than one MIME type
  - Text/html vs. application/xhtml+xml
  - Application/anything+xml vs. application/xml
  - Image/tiff vs. image/dng
  - Zip vs. zip-based MIME type
- Which to pick? How to resolve? False negatives?



# #16: Lack of explanatory text and justification

- Some justification in Barth et al cited research paper
- Test suite for validation against algorithm
  - Can we find at least one real, deployed, useful site (not made up for testing) which needs sniffing
- May need browser help to validate algorithm
  - Otherwise Hard to extract which MIME type is actually used
- Test suite should also cover email, ftp, file content
- Need help
  - Hosting, maintenance, running tests

# #22 Charset sniffing

- Part of overall “sniffing” process
  - Receiver needs to know not just MIME type, but entire content-type
  - Sniffing here is just first part of whole algorithm
  - If not part of this document  
charset sniffing still needs to be standards track
  - Sniffing charset currently HTML5 document
- If scope includes unlabeled content
  - \*SOME\* text types and application/something+xml types may need to know charset before proceeding
  - At least determining whether UTF16 or ASCII-compatible for XML declaration

# More issues

- All sniffing is potentially “privilege escalation”
  - E.g., `text/plain;charset=utf8` with buggy utf8 interpreter
  - Is privilege escalation the right concept?
- Sniffing for different purposes needs different algorithms?
  - presentation to end user
  - scanning for viruses, copyrighted material, “unwanted” content
- Standards track, BCP, Informational?